

TOP SECRET//COMENT//NOFORN//20291123

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

26 February 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U/FOUO) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//FOUO) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 31 December 2006 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive, and thus required to be reported pursuant to Section 1.7.(d) of Executive Order 12333.

(U//FOUC) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by means of inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) are described in the enclosure.

BRIAN R. MCANDREW
Acting Inspector General

VITO T. POTENZA General Counsel

(U/FOUO) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

KÉITH B. ALEXANDER Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Enci: Quarterly Report Approved for Release by NSA on 12-19-2014, FOIA Case # 70809 (Litigation)

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This Memorandum is Unclassified Upon Removal of Enclosure

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1. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

(b) (1)

a. Reviews

-(C//EF) During this quarter, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed various intelligence activities of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) to determine whether they were conducted in accordance with applicable statutes, Executive Orders (E.O.s), Attorney General (AG) procedures, and Department of Defense (DoD) and internal directives. With few exceptions, the issues presented were routine and indicated that the operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.

b. (d) inspections	(3)/2.1. 00-50	•	
(S//REL	Inspectors from		(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
and the NSA/C	SS OIG completed a joint inspec	tion of NSA/CSS Texas.	•
The process to track	database access and the		(b) (1)
developed by the Counterte	errorism division were commend	able; however, the	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
intelligence oversight progr	ram suffers from fragmented ma	magement, a lack of	
consolidated control, and a	lack of oversight at the program	a level. The NSA/CSS	
	cies and oversee corrective actio		

2. (U) GENERAL COUNSEL ACTIVITIES

(C//SI) The NSA/CSS OGC reviewed various intelligence activities of the NSA/CSS to determine whether they were conducted in accordance with applicable statutes, E.O.s, AG procedures, and DoD and internal directives. The OGC advised Agency elements on a number of questions, including the collection and dissemination of communications of or concerning U.S. persons; the reporting of possible violations of federal criminal law contained in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) product; the testing of electronic equipment, and the applicability of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). With few exceptions, the issues presented were routine and indicated that the operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.

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3. (U) SIGINT ACTIVITIES

a, (S//SI)-Collection Against U.S. Persons

(1) (U) Intentional	(4)	(1) (3)-P.L. 86-36			
granted also ap control activity citizens U.S. cit have be	(TS//SI) During this qual approval for consensual of proved non-consensual of led by foreign government agents of foreign possible been lizer taken hostage esual collection against	l collection against collection of U. its, U.S. organ wers during travel held aga	U.S. persons. I S. companies openl ization believed to s in the United State inst their will in and	OIRNSA/CHCSS y owned and support terrorist s; U.S. believed to		
person	. (S//Si) T he AG granted s overseas during this qu (U) Unintentional (b) (1 (b) (3	iarter.	(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3) -50 USC 302	5	(b) (1)	
collecte Intellig respon	ir (S//SI) ir ed communications to, figence tasking were report sible oversight officials, allowing actions were take	rom, or about U. S ted this quarter. A and corrective acti	ll of the incidents w	suing foreign ere reported to	(b) (3)-P.L.	86-36
•	The selectors or telephor	ne numbers for the	affected collection	were detasked		
· %	Queries were aborted at	nd deleted				
[Intercepts were deleted	and five so exists as	was warm arrand frame	///	-P.L. 86-36	. •
. w	Intercepts were deleted	and drauscripts we	ze removed from	database.		
5)-(3)-P.L. 86-36		an	d the related query	were deleted from] .	
ĺ						
	- TOP SEC	RET#COMINT#N	OFONN//20291123	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-3	6	

- TOP SECRET/	/COMINT//NO I	TR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	b)(1) b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 b)(3)-50 USC 302		
 Inadvertent collection that h SIGINT production was remo 		during the analysis	phase of		
Olesina producedor supreme	/	, Jogo Chrana		(b)(3)-P.L. 86-	-36
A target account was detask	ed and related portal.	data was removed from	m the	(5)(5)-1.1.00	-50
 b. 48//Si) Corrective actional discussions with our Intelligence. 	on, changes to i	internal controls, soft	ware changes,		
b. (U// FOUO) Dissemination of U	I.S. Identities				
(1) (U) Intentional					
(S//SI) In accordance with s Directive (USSID) SP0018, U.S. ide			illigence es during this		
quarter. The following table shows dissemination. In the "Unmasked	s the justification by Analyst" col	on and the number of umn, the U.S. identity	was revealed		
in a serialized end product; in the identity was released to a user at t			K	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-	36
JUSTIFICATION	Unmasked by Analyst	Unmasked at User Request	TOTAL	- Company of the Comp	
7.2.c Necessary					
7.2.c.1 Foreign Official					
7.2.c.3 International Narcotics					
7.2.c.4 Criminal Activity					
7.2.c.7 U.S. Government Official					
TOTAL					
(2) (U) Unintentional				-	
(S//SI) During this quarter, contained the identities of U.S. p the reports were either not reiss	ersons, organiz	cations, or entities. I	n all instances,		

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(3)	(U)	Raw	Traffic	Dissemination	3
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	a. (S//S1) SIGINT Production Chain.	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L.	86-3
			00 0
		Z	
	The SID ensures that the personnel are trained by the OGC on NSA/CSS's legal restrictions and on proper handling and		
	dissemination of SIGINT data Such persons		
	working in or with SID during this quarter included representatives of	(b)(3)-P.L.	86-36
	#2.	P.L. 86-36	
)	(b) (3) -	-18 USC 798 -50 USC 3024(i)	
-P.L. 86-	36 (1) (TS//SI//NF) NSA analysts recognized that the speaking employees of a had used telephones that		
\	were authorized for the collection of		
//	employees. The use was traced back to The telephone numbers		
\\	associated with the U.S. persons were detasked. The collection was destroyed. No reporting resulted from the collection.		
//	(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)	(3)-P.L. 86-36	
	(2) (TS//SH/NF) An NSA language analyst discovered that a telephone number had been detasked in		
1	had been detasked in ts a		
	This oversight resulted in collection when the intercept was purged from the database. No		
	reporting resulted from the collection.	`	
	(3) (TS//SD/NF) Human error resulted in the targeting of a		

	Targeting of the pational had been terminated	1	
	when he left the United States in The electronic mail (email) address was detasked and collection that had occurred only	,	
	on was purged from the database	(b)(1)	06.00
	(b) (1) (b) (3) P. L. 96.36	(b)(3)-P.L. (ช6 − 36
b)(1)	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)		
b)(3)-18	0SC 798 - 123 NK ROC2//4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		
D)(3)=50	USC 3024(i)		

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(4) (TS//SM/NF) Human error resulted in the collection of that	
were outside the time period authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance	
Court (FISC). Although after the FISC order (B) (3) -B I 86-36	
was signed on (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -18 USC 798	
The documents were deleted (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(1)	
when the error was discovered	
when are end was absorbed	
(5) (TS//S// NF) Communications from an authorized target were collected after (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36	
he entered the United States. NSA learned NSA learned	
that the target had been in the United States from	
. All target-associated collection was destroyed.	
(6) (TS//SL/NF) NSA analysts terminated tasking on	
at a FISA-targeted in the United (a) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36	
States when NSA learned that the (b) (3)-18 usc 798	
No reporting resulted from the (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(1)	1
unauthorized collection. NSA analysts are reviewing the database to determine if	
collection occurred.	
(7) (TS//SI//NF) Although the metadata for telephone intercepts collected (b) (1)	
during the quarter (b) (3)-P.L. 86-	-36
Collection was terminated, intercepts were deleted, and reports	
were cancelled.	
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	
(8) (TS//SL//NF) an analyst in the NSA (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(1)	
improperly disseminated unpublished SIGINT obtained through FISA	
collection. U.S. person information was passed via email to a	
Upon OGA	
recognition of the violation, NSA directed the destruction of the information. The	
destroyed copies of the email	
destroyed copies of the eman	
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36	
(9) (TS//SI//NF)	
communications of U.S.	
persons. All collection ceased when an NSA linguist identified the unintentional	
violation All U.S. person conversations were deleted from	
the database	
(b) (1)	
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	
(b) (1)	
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	

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